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IMPACT OF THE REA CASE ON THE LAW
OF ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
JAMES

A. EICHNER*

After the United States Supreme Court decided the cases of Weeks
v. United States' and Wolf v. Colorado,2 establishing a double standard
for the admissibility of evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure,
it was only a matter of time before a peculiar factual situation would
bring these rules into head-on collision. In certain cases prosecutors,
mindful of the contrary rules encountered in the federal and state
courts, could avoid difficulty by transferring a case involving unlawful
seizure from federal to state courts.3 But sooner or later a United
States attorney was bound to make a bad guess on the legality of a
seizure and find himself deep in a federal proceeding before he realized
that the case should have been turned over to his state counterpart.
REA V. UNITED STATES

4

In 1953 federal narcotics agent Jack Salter arrested Dantan George
Rea on a charge of acquiring marijuana without having paid the

*B.A. 1949, Cornell University; LL.B. 1956, University of Richmond; Member
of Richmond, Virginia, Bar.
1232 U.S. 383 (1914). A federal district judge, refusing to grant relief under the
fourth amendment, denied the defendant's timely application for return of papers
seized by a United States marshal in searching defendant's home without a warrant.
The Supreme Court held this to be a denial of the defendant's constitutional rights
under the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure.
2338 U.S. 25 (1949). It was held that the fourteenth amendment does not forbid.
admission of evidence illegally seized by a state officer in a state trial for a state crime,
although under the fourth amendment the evidence would be inadmissible in a
federal prosecution if similarly seized by a federal officer.
3"The great majority of [federal narcotics] investigations are turned over to
local officers because the federal rule makes the swift type of arrest and seizure a
practical impossibility." Rep. Calif. State Bar Comm. on Grim, Law and Proc., 29
CALIF. S.BJ. 263, 264 (1954). "In the past, criminal cases originating with federal
agencies have been diverted into State courts when technical difficulties under the
federal exclusionary rule were anticipated." Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained
by Illegal Searches, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 565, 590, n.97 (1955), quoting U.S. Attorney
Burke.
476 Sup. Ct. 292 (1956).

[178]
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federal transfer tax. 5 The marijuana to be offered as evidence was
obtained under a federal search warrant that was defective because
the supporting affidavit was made only on information and belief
rather than upon personal knowledge. 6 Rea's motion to suppress
the evidence was granted and the United States attorney, left without
evidence, moved to dismiss the prosecution.
Undaunted by this turn of events, agent Salter, through a New
Mexico justice of the peace, swore out a warrant charging possession
of marijuana in violation of state law.7 Arrested by state authorities,
Rea applied to the federal district court for an order to restrain
Salter from testifying in the state court concerning the illegally
obtained evidence and to have the marijuana destroyed or transferred
from Salter's control.
The district judge denied the motion, holding that the federal
rule authorizing suppression of evidence has no application to evidence
offered in a state court.8 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed on the same ground, 9 leaving Rea to seek relief under New
Mexico law. In denying the injunctive relief the appellate court
stated:10
"Say what you will, the effect of the relief sought would make
impossible prosecution by the state of its action against appellant. That is the purpose and the only purpose sought to
be accomplished by this proceeding and such an order would
constitute an interference with the state judicial process."
On January 16, 1956, the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision,
held that the federal agent must be enjoined from testifying in the
state trial." As a result the state prosecution, like the federal, was
dropped.
Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the majority opinion. Long a champion
of the view that the fourteenth amendment prohibits the use of
53 STAT. 281 (1939), 26 U.S.C. §2593 (a) (1952).
Transcript of Record, pp. 3-4, Rea v. United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 292 (1956). FED.
R. CRIM. P. 41 (c) provides: "A warrant shall issue only on affidavit sworn to before
the judge or commissioner and establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant."
7N.M. STAT. ANN. §54-5-14 (1953).

8Brief for Appellant, pp. 4-5, Rea v. United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 292 (1956).
9218 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1954).
'old. at 240.

"176 Sup. Ct. 292 (1956).
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illegally obtained evidence in state courts, 1 2 Justice Douglas and four
of his colleagues 13 "put all constitutional questions to one side" and
based their holding upon "our supervisory powers over federal law
4
enforcement agencies.'
In the dissenting opinion,15 Justice Harlan admitted that the
federal courts have the power to issue an injunction under their
general equity power but averred that the exercise of the trial judge's
discretion in this case should not be overturned. The dissenters
found the majority opinion inconsistent with the policy declared in
Stefanelli v. Minard6 that "federal courts should refuse to intervene
in State criminal proceedings to suppress the use of evidence even
when claimed to have been secured by unlawful search and seizure."
This holding, said Justice Harlan, was based on "the 'special delicacy
of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and
State administration of its own law.' The same consideration is applicable here."'
The majority distinguished the Rea case from Stefanelli v. Minard,
noting that in the latter case the injunction was sought against state
rather than federal authorities. The minority found this distinction
"illusory," for the state's case against the petitioner wholly depended
on the evidence in question; hence the injunction issued against
federal authorities had the same practical effect as if it had been issued
directly against New Mexico or its officials.
The Supreme Court in the Rea case was treading on new ground
in the no man's land between the areas of the Weeks and Wolf rules.
If the fedral courts had not intervened, the illegally obtained evidence would have been admissible in the state prosecution;' 8 and, since
the illegality of the search lay in a mere technical defect, the Supreme
Court, under the Wolf doctrine, would not have upset a conviction
based on such evidence. Justice Harlan felt that "to say that federal
interference is nevertheless justified at this point in the proceedings
whenever the state had not yet obtained the evidence seems to me
12See, e.g., his dissents in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 149 (1954); Stefanelli
v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 125 (1951); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 40 (1949).
"3Chief Justice Warren and Justices Frankfurter, Black, and Clark.
1476 Sup. Ct. 292, 293-294 (1956).
2"Id. at 294.
16342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951).
1776 Sup. Ct. 292, 295 (1956).
'8Breithaupt v. Abram, 58 N.M. 385, 271 P.2d 827 (1954); State v. Dillon, 34
N.M. 366, 281 Pac. 474 (1929).
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to make the matter simply a race between a state prosecution and a
federal injunction proceeding."'19
ADMISSIBILITY OF ILLEGALLY

OBTAINED EVIDENCE

Federal law enforcement agencies no doubt will adjust quickly
to the practical lesson of the Rea case and turn over to state prosecutors even borderline cases involving questionable search. The problem,
of course, is limited to cases in which both state and federal law prohibit the conduct in question, and to those states whose rules on
20
admissibility of illegally secured evidence differ from the federal rule.
When the improperly obtained evidence is noncontraband, such as
books and records, Rule 41 requires that it be physically returned to
the owner so that the question of the federal agent's keeping it and
later producing it in a state prosecution could never arise. 21 The
hazard to the defendant is increased when the evidence is contraband,
such as narcotics or illegal liquor, which the government can confiscate and keep in custody despite the granting of a motion to suppress
it as evidence.

22

Important enough in its own limited sphere, the Rea case in its
slight extension of federal protection against convictions based on unlawfully acquired evidence might possibly be the harbinger of a
broader change in a presently none-too-well-settled area of the law,
namely, the general use in state courts of evidence illegally obtained
by federal officers and, on the other hand, federal court treatment of
evidence illegally obtained by state and local police. This problem
involves questions of constitutional rights, federal equity power,
judicial supervision of the federal police, and the proper relationship
between the courts in our federal system.
1076 Sup. Ct. 292, 296 (1956).
20Approximately two fifths of the states follow the federal rule, and "the tide
seems to be flowing in that direction." McCORMICK, EVIDENCE §139 (1954); see the
tabluation in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33-39 (1949).
2FrD.R. CpuM. P. 41 (e).

22Marijuana or other property transferred or possessed for use in violation of
the revenue laws is subject to seizure and forfeiture, is not repleviable, and no
property rights exist therein, 52 STAT. 282 (1938), 26 U.S.C. §2598 (1952); 43 STAT.
362 (1924), 26 U.S.C. §3116 (1952); 28 U.S.C. §2463 (1952). In the Rea case agent
Salter retained the seized marijuana in his custody throughout the proceedings.
Letter, James A. Borland, Ass't U. S. Atty for Dist. of New Mexico, Feb. 23, 1956.
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Constitutional Questions
Originally, American courts, both federal and state, freely received evidence secured by illegal search and seizure, and in the
majority of the states this rule still applies. 23 The federal rule was
changed in 1914 by the Weeks case, which held that a federal court
could not admit as evidence papers taken by a United States marshal
in a search without a warrant. The Court further held that the search
violated the defendant's rights under the fourth amendment and
that the papers should be returned to the defendant if he made a
timely pre-trial motion. A similar search by local police did not fall
within the ambit of the fourth amendment, since these officers had
not acted under color of federal authority. It has also been held that
federal agents, after returning papers illegally seized, cannot use the
knowledge so obtained as the basis of requiring the defendants to
produce the evidence under subpoena. 24
In Wolf v. Colorado the Supreme Court held, in a six-three decision, that, although the fourteenth amendment protects citizens
against unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers, the Constitution does not require a state court to exclude evidence obtained
in the course of such an intrusion. The decision was more pragmatic
than theoretical; the Court elaborately catalogued the state and British
Commonwealth jurisdictions as to their rules on admissibility of
illegally obtained evidence, both before and after the Weeks decision.
With an obvious concern for the necessities of law enforcement, the
Court observed: "We cannot brush aside the experience of States
which deem the incidence of such conduct by police too slight to call
for a deterrent remedy not by way of disciplinary measures but by overriding the relevant rules of evidence." 25 The Court further justified its
26
stand by the argument:
"There are, moreover, reasons for excluding evidence unreasonably obtained by federal police which are less compelling in
the case of police under State or local authority. The public
opinion of a community can far more effectively be exerted
against oppressive conduct on the part of police directly re23McCon

IcK, EVIDENCE

§137

(1954).

24Silverthrone Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
25338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949).
26d. at 32.
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sponsible to the community itself than can local opinion, sporadically aroused, be brought to bear upon remote authority
pervasively exerted throughout the country."
The dissenting justices felt that the admission of such evidence
withheld the one effective remedy against police oppression.
In Rochin v. California27 the United States Supreme Court reversed a state court conviction because the illegal means used to
obtain evidence were so violent and brutal as to "shock the conscience"
and approached coerced confession. But two years later the Court
again upheld the Wolf doctrine by a five-to-four decision in Irvine v.
California,28 restricting the Rochin case to its facts. A curious aspect
of the Irvine decision is the majority's frank doubt about the desirability of the federal exclusionary rule.29 The doubt expressed reflected the rationale of the Wolf case, in which Justice Frankfurter,
for the majority, wrote in regard to the federal rule:30
"It was not derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth
Amendment; it was not based on legislation expressing Congressional policy in the enforcement of the Constitution. The
decision was a matter of judicial implication....
....

And though we have interpreted the Fourth Amendment

to forbid the admission of such evidence, a different question
would be presented if Congress under its legislative powers were
to pass a statute purporting to negate the Weeks doctrine."
27342

U.S. 165 (1952).

28347 U.S. 128 (1954).
291d. at 135, 136: "Our cases evidence the fact that the federal rule of exclusion
and our reversal of conviction for its violation are not sanctions which put an end
to illegal search and seizure by federal officers .... There is no reliable evidence
known to us that inhabitants of those states which exclude the evidence suffer less
from lawless searches and seizures than those states that admit it ....
".... That the rule of exclusion and reversal results in the escape of guilty persons

is more capable of demonstration that that it deters invasions of right by the

police. . . .Rejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-doing
official, while it may, and likely will, release the wrong-doing defendant .... It
protects one against whom incriminating evidence is discovered, but does nothing
to protect innocent persons who are the victims of illegal but fruitless searches.
The disciplinary or educational effect of the court's releasing the defendant for
police misbehavior is so indirect as to be no more than a mild deterrent at best."
30338 U.S. 25, 28, 33 (1949).
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Justice Black, concurring, said that the "federal exclusionary rule
is not a command of the fourth amendment but is a judicially created
rule of evidence which Congress might negate." 31 Here the Court
seems to be almost begging Congress to repudiate the Weeks doctrine
and thus to simplify this whole area of the law of evidence.
Judicial Supervision of FederalPolice
Despite such judicial doubts about the wisdom of the Weeks rule,
the absence of legislative action left the Court committed to its rule
that evidence illegally gathered by federal agents must be excluded
from federal trials. This rule necessitates judicial supervision of the
work of federal law enforcement agencies. The majority opinion in
the Rea case notes this,32 citing as authority for its conclusion the case
of McNabb v. United States.33 Justice Harlan takes issue with this
approach to the result: "So far as I know, this is the first time it has
been suggested that the federal courts share with the executive branch
of the government responsibility for supervising law enforcement
activities as such." 34 He says that the McNabb case does not stand for
the proposition that the federal courts have such authority over
federal police, quoting a pertinent line from that case: "We are not
concerned with law enforcement practices except in so far as courts
35
themselves become instruments of law enforcement."
Whatever the view taken of the supervisory authority of federal
judges over federal officers of the law, it is difficult to reconcile the
Wolf-Weeks-McNabb rules with the line of illegal search cases involving federal officers in state courts and vice versa. If, as Justice
Douglas asserts, the federal courts have a general supervisory power
over federal agents, apparently the presentation of tainted evidence
by a federal policeman in any forum would be frowned upon. If, as
Justice Harlan contends, the crucial question is whether the federal
courts themselves "become instruments of law enforcement," it seems
that the courts, as agents of the United States, would feel constrained
by their own rules to reject all evidence unlawfully obtained, lest they
sid. at 39.
3276 Sup. Ct. 292, 294 (1956): "[W]e have then a case that raises not a constitutional question but one concerning our supervisory powers over federal law enforcement agencies."
33318 U.S. 332 (1943).
3476 Sup. Ct. 292, 294 (1956).
35318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
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become participants in convictions based on violations of the fourth
or fourteenth amendments. The cases, however, make it clear that
the federal agent who has searched illegally is welcome in the courts
of a state that does not follow the federal rule36 and that evidence
unlawfully gathered by state officers acting independently and principally to enforce state law is received in federal prosecutions.37 It is
well to note the lack of final authority in both of these situations; a
denial of certiorari on one side 38 and a dictum on the other 39 appear
to be the United States Supreme Court's only pronouncements. Federal courts, however, are quick to find that state and city police, though
searching alone, are either seeking to enforce federal law or are cooperating with federal officials, so that they may be considered in
effect federal officers and their ill-gotten evidence rejected under the
40
federal rule.
FederalEquity Power and State Law Enforcement
Generally speaking, equity will not enjoin a criminal prosecution;
and federal courts, out of respect for this nation's peculiar system of
dual sovereignty, are expected to be particularly sparing in the use
of their injunctive power to stay criminal proceedings on the state
36E.g., State v. Gardner, 77 Mont. 8, 249 Pac. 574 (1926); Terrano v. State, 59
Nev. 247, 91 P.2d 67 (1939); Commonwealth v. Colpo, 98 Pa. Super. 460, cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 863 (1930).
37Burford v. United States, 214 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1954); United States v. Haywood, 208 F.2d 156 (7th Cir. 1953); Fredericks v. United States, 208 F.2d 712 (5th
Cir. 1953); Serio v. United States, 203 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1953); Jaroshuk v. United
States, 201 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1953); Scotti v. United States, 103 F.2d 644 (5th Cir.
1952); Taylor v. Hudspeth, 113 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1940); Rettich v. United States,
84 F.2d 118 (Ist Cir. 1936); United States v. Rathmann, 121 F. Supp. 763 (W.D.N.Y.
1954); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927) (dictum).
3sCommonwealth v. Colpo, 98 Pa. Super. 460, cert. denied, 282 U.S. 863 (1930).
39Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
4oLustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949) (city police unlawfully entered
hotel room and then called in federal agent, who examined and selected evidence;
held, the federal agent took part in the search and the evidence should be suppressed
in the federal trial); Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927) ( state troopers
who seized illegal whiskey without a warrant held to be acting solely on behalf
of United States); United States v. Butler, 156 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1946) (state
police who illegally searched bootlegger's car after ostensibly stopping it for state
traffic law violation found to be acting solely on behalf of United States); United
States v. Irwin, 86 F. Supp. 362 (W.D. Ark. 1949) (state police, in illegal search
during co-operation between state and federal authorities, in reality securing
evidence primarily for federal prosecution).
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level. 41 Federal courts, however, will enjoin state officials from enforcing their criminal laws when danger of irreparable injury to the
petitioner's constitutional rights is clear and immediate; 42 injunctive
relief will be refused when constitutional rights can be adequately
43
protected on appeal.
In Stefanelli v. Minard4 4 the petitioner sought to enjoin New Jersey
officials from the use of evidence seized by city police in an unlawful
search of his home. Under New Jersey law the illegally obtained evidence was admissible in the state criminal prosecution. The federal
trial judge, as in the Rea case, had refused to issue an injunction. The
Supreme Court, contrary to the result reached in the Rea case, affirmed,
finding that "no such irreparable injury, clear and imminent, is
threatened here." 45 The Court said that, although the trial judge
might have had the power to issue an injunction, to reverse his decision "would disregard the power of courts of equity to exercise
discretion when, in a matter of equity jurisdiction, the balance is
46
against the wisdom of using their power."
The question that gave rise to most dissention between the
majority and minority opinions in the Rea case was the apparent
inconsistency in granting an injunction in that case after an injunction had been denied in the Stefanelli case. In both cases the petitioner's freedom was largely dependent on the issuance of the injunction. If relief were denied, it would be futile to talk about adequate protection through a review of the state conviction, for both
New Jersey and New Mexico allow illegally secured evidence to be
used in criminal trials, and the rule of Wolf v. Colorado is that convictions so obtained will not be upset by the United States Supreme
Court.
Consequently Justice Harlan's reference, in the dissenting opinion
4lDavis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207 (1903); McGuire v.
Amrein, 101 F. Supp. 414 (D. Md. 1951).
42E.g., Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240
(1926).
43E.g., Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Spielman Motor Sales
Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935). In the Douglas case the Supreme Court held that
city officials should not have been enjoined from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting
distribution of literature without a license, since the rights of the petitioners,
if violated by the ordinance, could be protected on appeal.
44342 U.S. 117 (1951).
451d. at 122.
461d. at 120,
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of the Rea case, to Douglas v. City of Jeanette47 as authority for denial
of the injunction seems strange. In the Douglas case, since there was
no double standard of constitutional protection varying with the
forum,48 protection could have been afforded by appeal as well as by
injunction. Since the rationale underlying Douglas v. City of Jeanette
is that the petitioner will be protected in the long run regardless of
which remedy is afforded him, the case would seem to be better authority for the majority than for the minority in the Rea case. The
converse of this proposition is that when the existence or lack of protection is dependent upon the form of the remedy a court of equity
should step in.
Federal Equity and Supervisory Power
If the question of the application of federal equity power to state
criminal prosecutions is isolated, the result in the Rea case is contrary to the result in the Stefanelli case. But that question cannot
be isolated from the question of the federal courts' supervisory power
over federal law enforcement officers. The majority in the Rea case
seems to reconcile its decision with the Stefanelli case by pointing out
that in the former the Court was exerting its authority over an agent
of the United States, while in the latter injunctive relief was sought
against state officials. The minority minimizes this distinction by
pointing out that in both cases the success of the state prosecution
depended upon the outcome of the federal injunction proceeding.
It could be argued that the sole basis of the Rea decision was
the Supreme Court's desire to register disapproval of the federal
agent's actions. Justice Douglas said:4 9
"The only relief asked is against a federal agent who obtained
the property as a result of the abuse of process issued by a
United States Commissioner.
" To enjoin the federal agent from testifying is merely to
enforce the federal rules against those owing obedience to
them."
47See note 43 supra.

4SThe ordinance complained of in the Douglas case was declared unconstitutional
as an abridgment of freedom of expression in another case, an appeal from a
conviction under the ordinance, decided on the same day, Murdock v. Pennsylvania,

319 U.S. 105 (1943).
4076 Sup. Ct. 292, 294 (1956).
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Could it be that a contrary result would have been reached if the
prosecution had begun in a state court? Theoretically the federal and
state prosecutions are completely separate proceedings, cut off by the
wall of the federal system as completely as if the federal and county
courthouses in Albuquerque were in different worlds. But in practical effect the state prosecution was nothing more than the second
phase of a single proceeding, begun when the first phase ended by collision with the Weeks rule in the federal court. The thought of a
federal officer being told by a federal court that he cannot use his
illegally acquired evidence, then blandly ignoring that order by
walking into another courthouse, may have been too much for the
justices to take. Agent Salter's zealous persistence certainly smacks
of contempt, whether it amounts to that or not. If this element were
lacking in another case it might be easy for at least one justice to
cross over to the other side. After all, the granting or denial of an
injunction should depend in large measure on the sound discretion
of the chancellor. The Court in the Rea case held that the district
judge abused his discretion by denying the injunction. In similar
cases, when no order to suppress had been made and ignored, the
Court might hold denial of injunctive relief to be a proper exercise
of judicial discretion.
Then, too, it must be noted that the federal rules require that when
a motion to suppress is granted the illegally acquired property "shall
be restored unless otherwise subject to lawful detention and it shall
5°
not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial." "Any trial"
literally includes a subsequent state trial; and it is not unreasonable
to construe the congressional command of the rules to be that, once
an ajudication has been made that evidence was illegally acquired
and should be suppressed, it cannot thereafter be employed in any
forum. The statute providing immunity from prosecution for witnesses
testifying before congressional committees presents a good analogy for
this interpretation, for it has been construed to bar prosecutions in
state as well as in federal courts.51
5oFED. R. Cpam. P. 41 (e).
51"No testimony given by a witness before either House, or before any committee
of either House, or before any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent
resolution of the two Houses of Congress, shall be used as evidence in any criminal
proceeding against him in any court, except in a prosecution for perjury committed
in giving such testimony." 18 U.S.C. §3486 (1952), Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179
(1954). The phrase "in any court" includes state courts and precludes the use of
such testimony as evidence therein.
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Justice Douglas supports his stand in the Rea decision by talk of
abuse of process of the United States; this leads Justice Harlan, in
his dissent, to ask what the result would have been if the search had
been made with no warrant at all. It is difficult to see what difference
this would make, even under Justice Harlan's view that the federal
exclusionary rule is applicable only to cases in which federal courts
themselves "become instruments of law enforcement." The court
is an instrument of law enforcement regardless of whether its first con52
tact with the case is by issuance of a search warrant.
To dramatize the clash between state and federal authority, Justice Harlan asks what would happen if the New Mexico court should
subpoena agent Salter to testify before it. This question was apparently
answered in 1900, when the Supreme Court held, on a writ of habeas
corpus, that a state court cannot punish a United States Treasury agent
for his refusal to produce records that Treasury regulations require
to be kept confidential. 53 The federal command, then, is supreme:
if the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are not enough to justify
a federal officer's refusal to obey the state order, certainly a federal
injunction against him is enough.
CONCLUSION

The holding of the Rea case presents no radical departure from the
law developed in the Weeks and Wolf cases. It is no broader than
this: When a federal agent seizes evidence under an invalid federal
search warrant and that evidence is ordered suppressed in a federal
trial, the agent cannot produce the evidence or testify in regard to it
in a trial subsequently instituted in a state court. The Rea case cannot
be regarded as a step in the direction of federal abolition of the Wolf
rule. If the trend is toward adoption of the Weeks rule for the state
courts5 4 it is more likely to come locally, through legislation 55 or state
52See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951), in which it was held that a
motion should be granted to suppress evidence obtained by federal police in a
search without warrant. The Weeks case also involved a search without a warrant.
53Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900).
54See note 20 supra.
55E.g., the Texas statute, which provides: "No evidence obtained by an officer
or other person in violation of any provision of the Constitution or laws of the
State of Texas, or of the Constitution of the United States of America, shall be
admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case." TEx.
STAT. art. 727a (Vernon 1948).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1956

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1956], Art. 3
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
court decisions. 58
The curious dilemma that the Court faced in the Rea case was the
result of the existence side by side of two conflicting rules of evidence
so important that freedom or imprisonment often depends on which
one is applied. Whatever the relative merits of the Weeks and Wolf
rules, their very coexistence seems to be an unsatisfactory incongruity
which, in cases of overlapping jurisdiction, may allow the basic question of conviction or acquittal to depend on the tactic of choice of
forum. Efforts to rationalize this double standard on the grounds of
greater remoteness of control over federal police57 or the varying needs
of state and federal law enforcement 58 ignore the fact of co-operative
enforcement in some fields of greatest importance to the federal government. It is common practice for federal and state agents to work
in teams to seek out distillers of illegal whiskey, or for federal narcotics
officers to make arrests in conjunction with city police. Although
federal courts have often ignored the fact that a policeman was
state-employed in order to apply the federal rule to his illegally
gathered evidence, 59 it is doubtful that the Rea rule will be extended
to enjoin a state officer from testifying in the state court, even in the
case of state-federal co-operation in an unlawful search. Hence the
Rea rule might be avoided by broadening the practice of having local
police join in a search with federal officers.
Efforts to find a logical basis for the existence of two contradictory
rules may indicate a rather unhappy awareness that in one case or the
other a mistake was made. The Supreme Court itself has repeatedly
noted the benefits of the state rule of admissibility and has issued an
open invitation to Congress to legislate the federal exclusionary rule
out of existence. 69 It might well be that a retreat from the Weeks rule
56E.g., the decision of the California Supreme Court in People v. Cahan, 44
Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955), reversing People v. Irvine, 113 Cal. App. 2d 460,
248 P.2d 502 (1952), and holding evidence illegally obtained by state officers inadmissible in a state court; see Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal
Searches, 43 CALIF. L. R.v. 565 (1955).
57E.g., the Court's statement in the Wolf case, p. 182 supra.
58"[I]n general federal investigating agencies such as the F.B.I., Treasury and
Internal Revenue, operate with comparatively large budgets and highly selected
personnel and do not face the same types of problems as do the local police. The
federal agencies are not charged with maintaining law and order in large cities, nor
are they faced with the necessity of dealing constantly with emergency situations and
with the problem of criminals easily fleeing their jurisdiction." Barrett, supra note
56, at 591.
5
9See note 40 supra.
6OSee notes 29, 30 supra and text thereat.
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would have been made before this were it not for (1) particularly
articulate champions such as Justice Douglas, who looks upon the middle ground of the Wolf case as "part of the deterioration which civil
liberties have suffered in recent years,"61 and (2) a fear that abolition
of the exclusionary rule would extend too cordial an invitation to
lawless law enforcement. It is generally agreed that existing restrictions other than exclusion of wrongfully acquired evidence are somewhat useless. Successful criminal prosecution of a policeman who has
"gotten the goods" on a dope peddler through unlawful means is unlikely, departmental discipline of such a hero is unthinkable, and a
civil judgment against him will probably be unprofitable.
Professor Wigmore thought the solution worked out in the Weeks
62
case was just "misguided sentimentality":
"For the sake of indirectly and contingently protecting the
Fourth Amendment, this view appears indifferent to the direct
and immediate result, viz., of making Justice inefficient, and
It reof coddling the law-evading classes of the population ....
gards the over-zealous officer of the law as a greater danger to
the community than the unpunished murderer or embezzler
or panderer....
The natural way to do justice here would be to enforce
the healthy principle of the Fourth Amendment directly, i.e.,
by sending for the high-handed, over-zealous marshal who had
searched without a warrant, imposing a thirty-day imprisonment for his contempt of the Constitution, and then proceeding
to affirm the sentence of the convicted criminal."
...

Other critics point out that the federal rule may treat the guilty
more generously than the innocent. The guiltless one whose home
is wrongfully broken into by police has his questionable criminal or
civil remedy against the officers, but the criminal who is caught with
incriminating evidence as a result of the illegal search gets these
doubtful benefits and one vastly more valuable-a chance to win his
freedom despite overwhelming evidence of his guilt.63 One suggesOllrvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 151 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
628 WIGMOmE, EvIDENcE

§2184 (3d ed. 1940).

133Barrett, supra note 56, at 581. See also the comment of the Supreme Court
on this point in the Irvine case, note 29 supra.
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tion is akin to that of Wigmore's: admit the tainted evidence but
give the party whose privacy has been illegally invaded a remedy in
a civil action not only against the judgment-proof policeman but also
against the government that hired him.
The Rea case may suggest that the movement of the Supreme
Court's thinking is toward the exclusion of illegally acquired evidence
in state as well as in federal courts; it is submitted, however, that in
view of the closeness of the decision, and the factual setting of the case,
there is little reason for citing it as authority in any future case not
on all fours with the Rea case.64 With the present schizophrenia of
the law of unlawfully acquired evidence, either result in the Rea case
was bound to be less than satisfactory. While it may appear to be
somewhat of an invasion of state prerogatives by the federal courts,
the choice made by the majority is probably the better one. It not only
saves the dignity of the federal judiciary from a figurative nose-thumbing by a federal policeman, it also tells officers of the law exactly where
the line is drawn. It should be easy enough for them to avoid putting
themselves in Jack Salter's position.

64
In at least two recent instances the Court has rejected opportunities to extend
the scope of the exclusionary rule in other directions. In Sisk v. Overlade, 220
F.2d 68 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 876 (1955), 69 HARv. L. Rav. 758 (1956),
it was held that a federal court should not inquire, in a habeas corpus proceeding
in a state where unlawfully obtained evidence is not admissible, into a state court's
finding that evidence was lawfully obtained. In Walder v. United States, 347 U.S.
62 (1954), the Court held a federal agent's testimony concerning the illegal seizure
of heroin admissible for the purpose of impeaching defendant's credibility in a
later federal trial for a separate offense. The evidence had been suppressed in an
earlier trial.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol9/iss2/3

16

Eichner: Impact of the Rea Case on the Law of Illegal Search andSeizure

University of Florida Law Review
VOL. IX

SUMMER

No. 2

1956

EDITORIAL BOARD
T. MCINARNAY
Editor-in-Chief

WILLIAM

W.

RIcHARD A. HAMPTON

HENRY BARBER, JR.

Executive Editor

Executive Editor

C. MCALILEY
Executive Editor

HARRY G. CAuRRTT
Executive Editor

STEPHEN

WILLIAM

THOMAS L. MARP.

F.

HENRY

E.

H.

ROBBINSON

LARRY SANDS

MARTIN, JR.

YOUNG J. SIMMONS

SNOW MARTIN, JR.

CONTRIBUTORS
DONALD
JERRY

B.

R.

MALCOLM

CORBETT

W. GRAYBILL

RORERT M. MONTGOMERY, JR.

CROCKETT

JAMES W. RABE

MARION M. CROMWELL

SIDNEY C. WARD

BUSINESS STAFF
DANIEL D. MCMULLEN

OWEN McGOVERN, JR.

Assistant Business Manager

Business Manager

FACULTY ADVISERS
RORERT

B.

EUGENE F. SCOLES

MAUTZ

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
MARTHA B. CULPEPPER
[198]

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1956

17

